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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY OBVIOUS 
DEFECT WHERE LESSOR CONTRACTED To REPAIR-Defendant, lessor of a 
delivery truck, agreed with the lessee to maintain the vehicle in good con-
dition and make regular inspections. The lessee's driver was not to make 
any repairs or adjustments but was to deliver the truck to the lessor as it 
needed repairs or as requested for inspection. Two years after the lease was 
made, plaintiff-driver made a written request to the lessor for repairs 
to the floor in the driver's compartment. Although plaintiff left the truck 
overnight with the lessor and made several further requests, the floor was 
not repaired. One month after notifying the lessor, plaintiff slipped on a 
small spot where the metal was exposed and sustained severe injuries. In 
an action against the lessor for negligence, the jury returned a verdict for 
plaintiff. The trial court, however, granted the lessor's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the theory that there could be no 
liability since the defect was obvious, and not concealed. On appeal, held, 
reversed. Where by agreement a lessor has reserved control of the property 
through the exclusive right and duty to repair, tort liability for injuries 
incurred due to failure to repair may be imposed even though the defect 
was apparent. Campbell v. Siever, (Minn. 1958) 91 N.W. (2d) 474. 
The question of a lessor's liability for injuries caused by his failure to 
repair as agreed usually is resolved in terms of •:control." If the lessor had 
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control over the subject-matter, there is basis for liability for injury re-
sulting from a defective condition;1 without control there is no liability.2 
Developed in landlord-tenant situations, the original reason for this prin-
ciple was that one who is not able both to enter in order to repair3 and 
to exclude people until the danger is abated should not be liable.4 The 
same reasoning was applied in bailment cases.5 While most later decisions 
retain the "control" requirement, often the kind of control actually 
present is not that which was originally said to be necessary. It is not at 
all settled that a contract to repair confers control sufficient to impose 
liability. Many states declare that a mere agreement to repair confers no 
control.6 Others hold that although a lessor may acquire control in the 
sense of a privilege of entry, this is not sufficient. For instance, the New 
York court stated that the landlord must have the "power and right to ad-
mit people to the premises and to exclude people from them."7 "Ex-
clusive control" is required in Ohio.8 But other states, while agreeing 
that control is essential for liability, define it so that the type acquired 
by a lessor through an agreement to repair is sufficient.9 Minnesota has 
long held that an agreement to repair made by a landlord gives him im-
plied authority to enter the premises and that this is control upon which 
may be predicated duty and liability.10 But the trial court in the principal 
case felt compelled to apply the rule that it is also essential that the 
defect constitute a concealed danger; hence, there was no liability since the 
defect was obvious.11 The court in the principal case agreed that such 
is the usual rule but held it inapplicable where the defendant not only 
reserved control of the truck for the purpose of keeping it in repair but 
also provided that plaintiff and other drivers of the lessee were not to 
make any repairs whatsoever.12 This decision gives a new meaning and 
1 See Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W. (2d) 723 (1942). 
2 See Soulia v. Noyes, 111 Vt. 323, 16 A. (2d) 173 (1940); Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich. 
584, 44 N.W. (2d) 132 (1950), noted 49 MICH. L. REv. 1080 (1951). 
3 See Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933). 
4 Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931). 
5 Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. Co. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 P. 358 (1902). 
6 E.g., Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E. (2d) 465 (1946); Berkowitz 
v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934). See generally PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 
473-475 (1955). 
7 Cullings v. Goetz, note 4 supra, at 290. But see Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81 
N.E. (2d) 40 (1948). Comment, 48 MICH. L. REv. 689 (1950). 
8 Ripple v. Mahoning Nat. Bank, 143 Ohio St. 614, 56 N.E. (2d) 289 (1944). 
9 Saturnini v. Rosenblum, 217 Minn. 147, 14 N.W. (2d) 108 (1944); Hodges v. Hilton, 
173 Miss. 343, 161 S. 686 (1935). 
10 Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289 (1905); Saturnini v. Rosenblum, 
note 9 supra. 
11 The court cited O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 
(1910); 13 DUN. Dre., 3d ed., §6995a (1954); and 2 TORTS REsTATEMENT §§388 and 405 
(1934). The Restatement is somewhat ambiguous on this point. 
12 Principal case at 478. No supporting authority was cited. 
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a new consequence to control. Where the control retained includes the 
ability to exclude all others from repairing the vehicle, the consequence 
is liability even for obvious defects. The decision does not, however, de-
viate significantly from results reached through other approaches in 
analogous situations. That neither a landlord nor a bailor is liable when 
the harmful defect was obvious is supported by ample authority.13 But 
in the special situation where the lessor has covenanted to repair the 
subject-matter, courts allowing liability usually rule that when notified of 
the defect a lessor who fails to repair within a reasonable time is negligent,14 
and the apparentness of the defect bears only on the question whether 
the injured person had assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory 
negligence.15 Further, this conduct could be found only where the plain-
tiff was aware of the specific defect causing the injury, fully compre-
hended the danger it presented, and failed to exercise reasonable care in 
the face of the danger.16 It often is said that once the lessee has given 
notice of the need for repair, the lessor assumes the risk of injury to 
others and only after an unreasonable time has passed does the lessee again 
assume the risk.17 He does so then only because it is unreasonable to rely 
any longer on performance by the lessor and to protect himself he ought 
to make the repairs.18 Thus recovery often is allowed even though the 
defect was apparent. Such an approach seems preferable to dealing with 
the problem in terms of "control." It is suggested that the law should 
impose a duty of care with regard to any defects where there is an agree-
ment to repair plus an additional relationship such as lessor-lessee or 
bailor-bailee,19 since there is a strong probability of reliance by the lessee 
or bailee that the lessor or bailor will repair.20 This would provide a jus-
tifiable basis for tort liability which enables the uncertain and unhelpful 
concept of "control" to be discarded. 
Donald R. J ollifje 
13 E.g., Spinks v. Asp, 192 Ky. 550, 234 S.W. 14 (1921) (landlord); Blankenship v. 
St. Joseph Fuel Oil Co., 360 Mo. 1171, 232 S.W. (2d) 954 (1950) (bailor). 
14 Hudson v. Moonier, (8th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 96. 
15 Runnels v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, 220 Miss. 678, 71 S. (2d) 453 (1954); 
Witte v. Whitney, 37 Wash. (2d) 865, 226 P. (2d) 900 (1951); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 
223, 178 P. 234 (1919). 
16Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935). 
17 Peterson v. Zaremba, 110 N.J. L. 529, 166 A. 527 (1933); Bland v. Gross, IO N.J. 
Misc. 446, 159 A. 392 (1932), affd. 110 N.J. L. 26, 163 A. 891 (1933). 
18 Lebovics v. Howie, 307 Mich. 326, 11 N.W. (2d) 906 (1943); Busick v. Home Owners 
Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A. (2d) 190 (1941); Stoops v. Carlisle-Pennell Lumber Co., 
127 Wash. 82, 219 P. 876 (1923). 
19 Note, 83 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1935). 
20 Merchants' Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 
(1916); Scholey v. Steele, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 402, 138 P. (2d) 733 (1943); Anglen v. Braniff 
Airways, (8th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 736. See 2 TORTS llEsTATEMENT §357 (1934). On the 
general subject, see 163 A.L.R. 300 (1946) (landlord-tenant); 46 AL.R. (2d) 404 (1956) 
(automobile bailor-bailee). 
